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The All-Terrain Vehicle Case:
A Safety Program That Is Working
James V. Lacy*

I. Introduction
Perhaps the biggest safety issue ever to confront the Consumer Product Safety Commission
("the CPSC" or "the agency") in the past decade
has been the risks posed to consumers by allterrain vehicles ("ATVs"). ATVs are three- and
four-wheel motorized vehicles with balloontype tires that are intended for off-road use.
Originally developed in Japan for farming purposes, ATVs became the off-road recreational
craze of the 1980s after being introduced in the
United States.
As the popularity of ATVs increased, however,
the number of deaths and serious injuries associated with the vehicles also increased. According to statistics compiled by the CPSC, the
number of ATV-associated accidents treated in
hospital emergency rooms grew from 8,600 in
1982 to 85,900 by 1986.1 There have been at least
415 ATV-associated deaths since 1982.2 By 1987,
there were an estimated 2,500,000 ATVs in use, of
which approximately 1,475,000 or 59% were the
three-wheeled type. 3 The tremendous increase
in popularity of ATVs, as well as the number of
ATV-associated accidents and deaths, set the
stage for one of the most important and farreaching regulatory actions in the history of the
CPSC.

The CPSC, created in 1972, 4 is the federal
agency responsible for protecting consumers
from unreasonable risks of injury posed by
unsafe consumer products. The agency regulates, among other things, the safety of toys,
fireworks, hazardous chemicals in household
products, the packaging of poisonous products,
and children's sleepwear5 The CPSC is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, with regional
offices in major cities across the country. The
agency has about 520 full-time employees and
an annual budget of approximately $35 million
to monitor and enforce its regulatory actions for
6
emerging product safety problems.
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II. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
Compiles a Task Force
The CPSC began its regulatory action of ATVs
in the spring of 1985 by announcing its intent to
exercise safety jurisdiction over the vehicles. 7 A
multi-disciplinary Task Force that included experienced engineers, epidemiologists and safety
experts was compiled to conduct a complete
study of ATVs and the risks posed by their use.
In September of 1986, the ATV Task Force
issued its report to the CPSC and the public.8
This report, some 12,000 pages in length, comprised the first comprehensive review of ATVs
ever compiled by a government agency. Included in the report were detailed studies of 169
different accident patterns.9 The report reviewed
complex engineering and human factor issues
associated with ATV use, provided an objective
analysis of the causes of ATV accidents, and
made specific recommendations for reducing
the risks posed to consumers. The report also
provided an important element of evidence in
support of obtaining mandatory safety relief
from ATV manufacturers if voluntary efforts to
obtain safety relief proved fruitless. The principle conclusions of the report were: threewheeled ATVs are more likely to be involved in
accidents than four-wheeled ATVs; suspensions
systems play a major role in ATV handling; and
children under the age of 16 who ride adult-size
machines are about twice as likely to have an
accident as adults. Significantly, rider inexperience is cited as the single biggest risk factor,
with the likelihood of an accident for a new rider
13 times higher than that for a rider with one
year of experience. 10
The ATV Task Force was unable to pinpoint a
specific mechanical defect in ATVs that caused
accidents. It was clear, however, that the "tricky"
use characteristics of ATVs, which are different
from those necessary to operate a motorcycle,
played a role in accident patterns, and that accidents could potentially be significantly reduced
through comprehensive rider training.11
The Task Force also determined that rider
misuse played a statistically significant role in
many of the more serious accidents. Problems
such as riding on paved roads, riding with passengers (which interferes with the unique rider-

machine interaction necessary to avoid an accident) and not unexpectedly, riding while
intoxicated, were contributing factors in numerous accidents.12 Specifically, the Task Force
found that 30% of all fatal accidents and 14% of
all reported accidents involved alcohol use or
abuse.1

3

The Task Force concluded that consumer
awareness of the risks associated with ATV use
was low. This low awareness level was compounded by the ATV industry's advertisements.
Such advertisements rarely emphasized safety
warnings and sometimes depicted "thrill seeking, dare-devil" use of ATVs in visual displays,
thereby suggesting to consumers that such behavior was safe, and the normal way to use an
ATV.14

Based on its study, the ATV Task Force recommended that the CPSC promulgate consumer
notices and warnings about the risks posed by
ATVs to reduce the number of accidents and
correct the lack of safety warnings in the ATV
industry's advertisements."i The Task Force encouraged the CPSC to secure atraining program
for consumers, to be funded by the ATV industry, in order to reduce the number of accidents
involving less experienced riders. Because the
Task Force had been unable to pinpoint a specific mechanical defect in the ATVs, it did not
recommend that any ATVs be recalled or
banned. In substance, the Task Force concluded
that while ATVs were risky products to use, the
over-all risk to consumers could be brought
down to reasonable proportions through notices, effective warnings, and training. Thus,
completely removing ATVs from the market16
place was neither necessary nor appropriate.
Ill. ATV Manufacturers Resist Task Force's
Suggestions
The ATV industry is comprised of the United
States subsidiary corporations of Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki, and the United States
manufacturer, Polaris Industries of Minnesota.
Initially, the industry resisted suggestions by the
CPSC that the Task Force's recommendations be
implemented. After publication of the Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the CPSC,
however, some manufacturers took voluntary
action to improve safety labelling and other

warnings to consumers. Yet, even among those
manufacturers who voluntarily had improved
their consumer warnings, disagreements with
the CPSC continued over the role of human
behavior in connection with ATV accidents. By
late 1986, it was clear that voluntary efforts on
the part of the ATV industry were not going to
result in the broad steps the CPSC and its staff
experts thought necessary to address the growing number of accidents.
At this point, CPSC Commissioners were confronted with a choice among the three types of
regulatory actions available to them: 1) ban ATVs
all together; 2) attempt to recall ATVs based on a
defect in their manufacture; or 3) seek a declaratory judgment that ATVs were unsafe and obtain
appropriate injunctive relief.17 A total ban of
ATVs would be prospective in nature only and
would require three stages of hearings, and
proscribed statutory findings supported by substantial evidence on the record. Moreover, the
CPSC or the ATV manufacturers could appeal
any decision requiring a ban, thus causing substantial delays. 18 Recalling ATVs would require a
hearing before an administrative law judge and
a showing of substantial evidence of a "defect
which could create a substantial product hazard."19 Again, the decision could be appealed by
either side, thus delaying its implementation. In
fact, given the strong objections of the ATV
manufacturers, both options, even if supported
by the evidence, could be expected to take several years to implement. In the meantime, ATV
users would continue to be injured or killed in
20
accidents associated with ATV use.
The third option-seeking injunctive reliefwould provide much quicker relief. Under Section 12 of the Consumer Product Safety Act
("Section 12"), the Commission could go directly into court to seek a declaration by a federal judge that ATVs constituted "imminently
hazardous" consumer products, and seek appropriate injunctive relief. 21 This little-used section
of the statute is intended for use in only the most
extreme circumstances, when other regulatory
procedures can not be expected to move quickly
22
enough to address a product safety problem.
In addition, a court likely has the discretion
under this statutory provision to order a remedy
such as corrective advertising, and perhaps
something as unique as a free training program.

In December of 1986, the three sitting Commissioners of the CPSC decided to proceed
against the ATV manufacturers under Section 12.
The CPSC sought a judicial order that would
require ATV manufacturers to offer free training
to ATV purchasers and immediate past purchasers, as well as widespread dissemination of notices and warnings concerning the risks of ATVs to
consumers. The Department of Justice was asked
to assist in representing the CPSC.
The process of achieving an ATV safety package from a federal judge was not without its
pitfalls, however. The complex factual and legal
issues presented in the case caused disagreement not just between the ATV manufacturers
and the CPSC, but also within the CPSC itself.
For example, Terrence Scanlon, the Chairman of
the ATV Enforcement Action, supported seeking injunctive relief under Section 12 but did not
believe that recalling ATVs was appropriate.
Against the advice of most of their staff, two of
the three CPSC Commissioners voted to seek
another unique remedy, one that had not been
recommended by their expert Task Force, and
that had never before been ordered by a federal
court in any prior product safety case. Termed a
"voluntary refund," this unique remedy would
require the manufacturers to offer a refund to
any consumer who had purchased a threewheeled ATV or an adult-sized four-wheeled
ATV for a child under 16 years old.
The purpose of this remedy was to provide
restitution to consumers who allegedly had
been led to believe that ATVs were safe by the
misrepresentations of dealers and the advertising practices of the ATV industry. The problem
with such a remedy was that it was not clearly
within the CPSC's jurisdiction.23 It was not a
remedy that created a safer environment because it required neither removal of an allegedly
dangerous product from the marketplace nor
repair or replacement of that product. Moreover, because it did not prohibit the resale of
returned ATVs, different and perhaps even less
experienced consumers would likely purchase
the ATVs and ultimately be injured. This remedy
was not justified by the safety-related evidence
available to the CPSC and was unlikely to have a
positive safety-related result. For these reasons,
the Commissioners appeared to have overstepped their statutory authority by confusing
(continued on page 66)
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the legal mandate and limitations of the CPSC's
authority with their own notion of consumer
equity. The legislative history of the CPSC demonstrates that Congress clearly did not intend
CPSC Commissioners to second guess decisions
consumers make to buy products in the marketplace. 24 Consumer protection beyond the range
of product safety has been reserved to either the
courts or other federal and state agencies that
administer statutes requiring truth-in-advertising or prohibiting deceptive practices. The Commissioners' request that a "voluntary refund" be
provided to certain ATV purchasers ultimately
caused only confusion and delay.
IV. Both Sides Prepare For Trial
By February of 1987, CPSC lawyers, in conjunction with attorneys in the Civil Division of
the United States Department of Justice, began
to prepare the complicated case for trial. Initially,
they needed time to identify experts who could
conduct tests corroborating the CPSC report.
Given the continuing toll of injury and death
statistics, the desirability of an out-of-court settlement was self-evident. The attorneys for the
ATV manufacturers made it clear they would
appeal an unfavorable district court decision
and seek a stay of any regulatory action pending
their appeal. This action would postpone any
potential benefits to consumers for two to three
years. Even if the case were resolved in the
CPSC's favor, an estimated 900 persons would
die and 250,000 persons would be seriously
injured in ATV-related accidents over the next
three years. Such statistics strongly favored a
settlement.
In May of 1987, the CPSC and Department of
justice responded to the ATV manufactures'
request to meet to discuss potential settlement
terms. However, strong political opposition to
the notion of a settlement with the Japanese ATV
manufacturers, expressed through the intervention of the House of Representatives oversight
committee chairman, Doug Barnard (D.-Georgia), contributed to lack of resolve on the part
of two CPSC Commissioners and stopped settlement discussions almost as soon as they began. In a letter to Attorney General Edwin
Meese, Representative Barnard stated, "I
strongly urge the Department and the C.P.S.C.
to... bring the action under Section 12 without

delay. ' 25 This intervention probably delayed a
final settlement of the case by at least seven
months, during which time approximately 40,000
ATV users were seriously injured.
By December of 1987, the CPSC was ready for
trial and, apparently encouraged by Senator
Albert Gore (D.-Tennessee), the CPSC oversight
committee chairman in the Senate, the ATV
manufacturers once again approached the CPSC
regarding settlement discussions. The CPSC
again felt pressure from Capitol Hill, but this
time in the direction of immediate settlement
talks. In a letter to Chairman Terrence Scanlon,
Senator Albert Gore stated, "It is my understanding that, in this type of complex litigation,
some negotiations are virtually always undertaken. Therefore, I encourage you to schedule
within the next few days a meeting between the
Commission and the distributors of ATVs.... I
am hopeful that those discussions will produce
an agreement regarding comprehensive, quick
steps to reduce safety hazards associated with
ATVs. ' '26 Unexpectedly, the CPSC majority decided to authorize staff counsel to organize a
settlement meeting. CPSC counsel suggested to
the ATV manufacturers in strong terms that they
should bring their best offer to the bargaining
table. From this point on, settlement discussions
included the active participation of Justice Department lawyers.
The result of three weeks of intense negotiations was the immediate stop-sale of all new
three-wheel ATVs in late December of 1987. The
stop-sale was accomplished through a preliminary consent decree filed simultaneously with
the Government's complaint. 27 In effect, new
three-wheeled ATVs which had been shown to
be riskier than four-wheeled models, were immediately banned from commercial sale without any of the delays that would result from the
time-consuming regulatory process. In addition,
the ATV manufacturers were required to repurchase the 40,000 or so new three-wheeled ATVs
in their dealer inventories thereby removing
them from the United States market. In return
for the ATV manufacturers' agreement to the
stop-sale, the Government agreed to drop its
prior insistence on a "voluntary refund." This
compromise encouraged both sides to settle the
case and put safety remedies in place as soon as

possible28

The parties established a framework for what
was to become a 154-page final consent decree2 9
covering virtually every aspect of the marketing
and advertising of ATVs. The consent decree also
outlined the methods by which ATV manufacturers should disseminate widespread consumer notices and warnings, as well as information
about comprehensive free training programs.
V. The Final Consent Decree
The defendant ATV manufacturers were required to spend close to $8 million on an eight
week television campaign, including advertisements during the World Series and Monday
night football games, to inform consumers of
the risks associated with ATV use and to encourage them to participate in the comprehensive
training program.3 0 This provision is unquestionably the largest cash payout for corrective
advertising in the history of the CPSC.31 To rein-

force the television campaign, the defendants
were also required to conduct an outreach
campaign utilizing mail and print media. 32 Past
purchasers of ATVs received updated safety information and new warning labels. Finally, the defendants were required to expand the safety in-33
formation included in ATV operator's manuals.
The consent decree also placed great emphasis on point of purchase information, thus insuring that consumers have safety information
readily available to them at the time of purchase. 34 ATV dealers are required to post prominent signs detailing the unique handling characteristics and safety risks associated with ATVs.
Dealers must also provide a toll free number for
consumers to enable them to obtain further
safety information. 35 Lastly, dealers must place
tags on showroom vehicles in order to further
emphasize the safety information on the signs
and safety labels, as well as in the 36
owner's manuals that come with each vehicle.
The consent decree defines an adult-size ATV
by engine size and requires the industry to recommend that only persons age 16 years old and
older ride adult-sized vehicles. 37 It allows for the
marketing of a smaller, statistically safe fourwheel vehicle to children age 12 to 15 years old.38

Under the terms of the consent decree, the
defendants are required to establish and staff
permanent offices that will administer an ap-

proved safety training program to consumers.
The program is available at no cost to immediate
past purchasers. 39 New purchasers are offered a
$50 cash rebate for the training program, or
other benefits at the purchaser's option.40 Additionally, the CPSC agreed to establish a repository for public information regarding the consent decree, which consists of all consumer and
public comments about the decree, as well as
information supplied by the ATV industry in
connection with enforcement of the decree.41
During testimony before a Congressional committee, one lawyer for the ATV manufacturers
estimated that the costs involved in implementing the final consent decree would be in excess
of $100 million over the ten-year life of the
decree. 42 After conducting a hearing on the
merits and rejecting requests to set aside the
decree, Judge Gerhard Gesell wrote: "No decree designed to protect consumers has ever
gone this far in43meeting such a national consumer problem."
V1. Conclusion
The implementation of the consent decree
has required continued vigilance on the part of
the CPSC and the Department of Justice. The
monitoring of sales representations of approximately 5000 ATV dealers around the country has
revealed some non-compliance among eager
salesmen in at least one state.44 Steps by the
manufacturers to correct this problem have
included threatening dealers with the withdrawal of their franchise. The failure of many state
legislatures to enact supplementary safety provisions on matters not within the CPSC's jurisdiction, such as minimum age licensing laws, helmet
laws, and strict penalties for riding with passengers or for riding while intoxicated, continues to be a very serious public safety problem.
Nevertheless, recent injury statistics from the
CPSC demonstrate that the number of serious
injuries associated with ATVs is finally decreasing. According to national estimates, the total
number of serious injuries was reduced in 1988,
subsequent to the stop-sale of three wheelers,
by about 15,000 accidents. This is a 19% reduction in just one year.45 ATV manufacturers' estimates concerning the injury rate per ATV in use
also show a 19% reduction in the number of
accidents in 1988. It is very likely that the injury
rate will continue to decrease as more imme(continued on page 68)

All-Terrain Vehicles

(from page 67)

diate past purchasers are trained, new purchasers are informed of the risks, and more of the

1977) denied Section 12 jurisdiction over household wiring. See
also, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation v. CPSC,414 F.
Supp. 1047 (D.Del.1976) and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation v. CPSC, 428 F.Supp. 177 (D.Del 1977); and CPSC v.
Advance Machine Co., Inc. et. al., Civ. A. No. 77-1323, slip op.
(D.D.C. 1978) consent judgment entered May 8,1979, where an
automatic pitching machine alleged to be an imminent hazard,
resulted in a consent decree.

less risky four-wheel ATVs are sold.46 Assuming

the ATV consent decree is given time to work,
the number of injuries suffered by consumers
will be significantly reduced and consumers will
continue to have the benefit and utility of ATVs.
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